航天测控软件共用技术研究与实现

软件共用是航天测控软件的发展趋势,分析了航天测控软件共用的可行性,并选取火箭遥测软件作为原型验证系统,提出了解决方案和设计方法,采用ICE中间件和构件技术实现了该原型验证系统,经测试验证,分布式部署的原型验证软件各项指标满足测控任务软件的技术要求,对航天测控软件共用研究具有重要的借鉴和指导意义。     

具有适应值预测机制的遗传算法

针对适应值计算费时的优化问题,提出一种具有适应值预测机制的遗传算法:为了有效控制预测适应值的准确度和预测频率,建立了一个基于可信度概念的适应值预测模型,引入可信度流失机制以减少预测误差的传播和累积,引入冗余个体剔除机制以减少计算消耗。利用3个基准函数对算法进行收敛性和有效性的测试,测试结果表明算法对于3个测试函数均能获得满意的最优解,并且都能减少60%以上的真实适应值计算次数。     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

基于感知信息共享的C2网络特征分析*

指挥控制(C2,Command and Control)关系网络连接数的增加会增强指控节点之间的信息共享,但也会增加节点信息处理和交换负荷,如果达到一定程度,则会造成节点本身的"信息过载"从而影响C2网络性能.对此,通过研究C2网络在两种不同处理方式下的共享感知信息平均提交时间,用网络节点响应时间的均方差表征一个C2网络的共享态势感知时间的一致性,最后对两种不同结构C2网络特征参数的计算,说明了网络连接增加会导致信息提交时间的延长,但一致性会增强.     

Fleet management in European integration: the case of military helicopter support

The article focuses on both economics and spatial issues related to Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) of defence platforms in Europe. Using facts and figures related to costs, trends and fleet sizes evolution, the authors discuss the interest of a spatial reorganisation of MRO production. Given the fiscal situation of the main European countries with a modern army, the relevant scale to consider the reorganisation is certainly Europe. Through the example of defence helicopters fleets of a selection of European countries, the authors address the question of cooperation of the MRO. A greater cooperation in the support of fleets would lead to a spatial reorganisation of MRO. On one side economies can be expected from this reorganisation, but, on the other hand, new problems arise. Specifically, a number of costs associated with different forms of “distances” – geographical, operational and political distances – limit the potential savings that could be expected. This work provides insights on these important issues for the construction of a European defence, both in its political, military and industrial dimensions.     

共享态势认识的效用

态势认识是指挥控制过程在认知域中的重要环节,认识共享是改进态势认识、减少认识偏差的重要手段。文中在分析态势认识的基础上,提出战术相关要素的发现概率、态势认识中的理解程度和理解偏差的概念,建立了用于态势认识的定量评估的数学模型,分析了认识共享对战场态势认识的改进程度,导出了团队合作时战术相关要素发现概率与个体数量的关系式,给出理解偏差与个体数量的联系方程并求出极值条件。     

运动矢径对AUV协同定位精度影响的仿真

针对在基于运动矢径的自主水下航行器(AUV)协同定位算法中运动矢径对定位精度的影响进行了仿真分析.利用扩展卡尔曼滤波设计了AUV协同定位算法,通过设定不同的运动矢径对该协同定位算法进行仿真,分析研究了运动矢径的变化对定位精度的影响.仿真结果表明,该定位算法受运动矢径的影响,增大运动矢径会使滤波误差波动变大,降低定位精度.     

先验式秘密共享方案及实现

分析了传统的秘密共享算法的不足之处,提出了相应的优化方案,形成了先验式秘密共享方案,包括初始化、份额更新、份额恢复和秘密重构,实现了先验式秘密共享协议的各种算法,充分考虑了秘密分享的各个阶段可能遇到的问题,并分别给出了相应的解决方案.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Stability of information‐sharing alliances in a three‐level supply chain

In their recent article, Leng and Parlar (L&P) (2009) analyze information‐sharing alliances in a three‐level supply chain (consisting of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer) that faces a nonstationary end demand. Supply chain members can share demand information, which reduces information distortion and thus decreases their inventory holding and shortage costs. We expand the results from L&P by considering dynamic (farsighted) stability concepts. We use two different allocation rules and show that under some reasonable assumptions there should always be some information sharing in this supply chain. We also identify conditions under which the retailer in a stable outcome shares his demand information with the distributor, with the manufacturer, or with both remaining supply chain members. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010